



6C STRATEGIC SCENARIO REPORT • CONFIDENTIAL STRATEGIC DECISION
SUPPORT ANNEX

6C strategic analysis

EUSEMICON2035

ACTOR	European Union
STRATEGIC COUNTERPART	China
OBJECTIVE	European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035
REFERENCE CONTEXT SET	25 October 2026 09:07 CET
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CONFIDENTIAL — CLIENT DECISION SUPPORT For authorised decision-support use. The annex is intentionally more transparent about the client case than the public Transversal report while retaining the proprietary method boundary.

Decision Traceability & Reassessment

HOW TO USE THIS ANNEX

This confidential annex opens the case-side reasoning behind the executive strategic choice. It shows the recorded assessments, their evidence lineage and the declared sensitivity tests. It does not disclose proprietary model internals, algorithms, formulae or source code.

Scope note: The annex supports validation of the represented case and the assumptions that sustain the choice. It is not a probability model, an audit opinion or a substitute for executive judgment.

Note on strategy names: Public strategy labels are explanatory renderings used for decision communication. Proprietary motor definitions and their internal representation are not part of this annex.

Tactical-development note: Operational and tactical implications remain hypotheses for subsequent design and validation unless they are explicitly supported by recorded evidence.

01 / DECISION BASIS AT A GLANCE

FOCAL ACTOR European Union	STRATEGIC COUNTERPART / OPPOSING CONSTRAINT China
OBJECTIVE European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035	CURRENT STRATEGIC FAMILY Opportunistic timing and context exploitation · Fortification and consolidation
SELECTED PUBLIC STRATEGIC MECHANISMS Use time as leverage · Accumulate small gains · Pilot, learn, scale · Renew before disruption · Build preventive barriers	ROBUSTNESS SUMMARY 26 stable / same-family outcomes · 69 composition changes · 16 full family switches · 111 declared one-variable-at-a-time tests

Decision-critical sensitivities

- European Union — Relational capacity — toward a lower assessment
- European Union — Context Adherence — toward a lower assessment
- European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Relational capacity — toward a lower assessment
- European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Relational capacity — toward a higher assessment
- European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Context Adherence — toward a lower assessment
- European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Context Adherence — toward a higher assessment

02 / ASSESSMENT REGISTER

Confidence (0–100) indicates how firmly the direction of the recorded assessment is supported by the available evidence and its convergence. It is distinct from the assessment value and range, and is not a probability of correctness, success or future occurrence.

Objective distribution describes how shareable or conflictual the objective is across the relevant actors or forces in the reference representation: lower values indicate greater compatibility/shareability; higher values indicate greater conflict or zero-sum character.

Actor-condition assessments describe the actor's currently assessed strategic capacity or condition. Objective-condition assessments describe the context-dependent required /appropriate level of that condition for the actor to have a credible strategic basis for attaining the stated objective. Required does not mean maximal: the objective profile is calibrated to what the objective and context call for, not automatically to 5.00. The two are separate judgments even when some evidence overlaps. Time Availability is positively oriented in both scopes: higher means more usable timing room, sequencing freedom or a more durable/reversible window; urgency, closing windows or adverse lead-time mismatch point toward lower Time Availability unless the evidence establishes compensating timing freedom.

Integrated relationship and objective-interest values are directional positive-scale assessments. A relationship value expresses the strategic strength or consequentiality of the named source subject's relationship toward the target: higher means stronger or more consequential, not friendlier. An objective-interest value expresses how strategically important or salient the objective is to the named source subject: higher means greater importance, not support for the focal actor's attainment. The qualitative character of the relationship or interest is stated separately in the rationale. These are model coordinates, not percentages, distances or probabilities.

6C condition scale anchors: 0.01 = lower end; 3.00 = configured neutral reference; 5.00 = upper end. Higher values indicate more of the named condition. These are calibrated assessment coordinates, not probabilities or physical measurements.

Assessment	Recorded value	Assessment rationale	Evidence lineage
European Union — Defensive strength	3.12 Plausible range: 2.36–3.93 Confidence (0–100): 65%	The EU has an established policy framework and meaningful industrial assets, but continuing external dependence in advanced production and design limits its present ability to defend semiconductor supply and autonomy across the full chain. European industrial strengths coexist with concentrated external dependencies in critical semiconductor inputs, limiting protection from supplier concentration. International specialization and partner links provide options, but advanced production and design dependencies constrain substitution across essential stages.	Direct evidence links: 20 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
European Union — Offensive strength	3.08 Plausible range: 2.30–3.90 Confidence (0–100): 65%	European policy and industry provide a basis to expand production and retain important positions, but independent review finds that current implementation and investment are unlikely to deliver the original 2030 share ambition. Equipment, research and downstream industry create real value-chain foundations, but advanced-stage dependencies interrupt integration. Established international links support resource diplomacy, though no privileged producing-country arrangement is identified.	Direct evidence links: 15 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.

European Union — Relational capacity	3.26 Plausible range: 2.43–4.04 Confidence (0–100): 64%	The Union can coordinate through common institutions, policy frameworks and economic-security instruments. The need for further implementation and demand coordination shows that this capacity is meaningful but not frictionless. EU institutions and international partnerships support coordination, although member-state differences constrain a uniformly durable approach. Common institutions and economic-security instruments enable coordination, while member-state differences and implementation gaps limit it.	Direct evidence links: 15 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
European Union — Potential energy	3.29 Plausible range: 2.51–4.07 Confidence (0–100): 65%	The EU has a substantial research, industrial and institutional base and has mobilized policy support, but audit findings on investment sufficiency and production scale constrain the estimate of currently available, convertible capacity. Substantial public and private semiconductor investment is mobilized, but audit findings identify limits in scale and conversion to capacity. Research, equipment and industrial-chip strengths establish technical know-how, though not across all semiconductor stages.	Direct evidence links: 19 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
European Union — Time availability	2.80 Plausible range: 2.11–3.54 Confidence (0–100): 64%	The 2035 horizon provides usable time for adjustment, but the long development cycles of semiconductor capacity, current dependencies and continuing supply-chain uncertainty reduce the EU's practical sequencing freedom and make timing windows less secure. The EU has usable time to adjust, but concentrated dependencies and uncertain disruption windows limit its timing freedom and adaptive room. A defined 2035 horizon leaves options, but geopolitical shifts and long investment cycles limit durable timing freedom.	Direct evidence links: 22 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
European Union — Context Adherence	3.11 Plausible range: 2.26–4.00 Confidence (0–100): 61%	Semiconductor resilience and technological capacity fit the EU's stated economic-security and industrial priorities. The continuing reliance on external advanced production and the implementation gaps identified by reviewers show that present capabilities do not yet fully fit those priorities. The stated aim reduces vulnerabilities without eliminating imports, fitting the EU's interdependent industrial position. The objective balances resilience with downstream competitiveness; energy, demand and investment constraints make cost fit uneven.	Direct evidence links: 21 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
China — Defensive strength	3.69 Plausible range: 2.89–4.45 Confidence (0–100): 66%	China's industrial position and authority to license or restrict selected exports provide substantial means to protect strategic supply-chain interests. The available sources do not establish equivalent control across every semiconductor stage. China's industrial scale and selected critical-material processing provide protection, although not across the full semiconductor chain. China has a strong position in selected materials processing, but this does not establish control across every processing bottleneck.	Direct evidence links: 12 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
China — Offensive strength	3.82 Plausible range: 3.06–4.54 Confidence (0–100): 66%	China has a consequential semiconductor and materials position and demonstrated state capacity to regulate selected supply-chain flows. The estimate is limited to those grounded strengths and does not assume dominance across the entire value chain. China has substantial industrial capacity in selected stages, although advanced-technology constraints limit its reach. Export controls demonstrate state regulatory leverage over selected supply-chain flows, not universal control.	Direct evidence links: 11 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.

China — Relational capacity	3.32 Plausible range: 2.64–4.00 Confidence (0–100): 60%	China’s importance to international supply chains gives it consequential relationships and channels of influence. The available evidence also shows economic-security tensions, and is insufficient to characterize its current capacity to coordinate or reassure the EU across this field. Industrial scale and policy links connect China to producers and processors, though specific relationship durability is uncertain. Industrial policy and state authority connect public priorities to semiconductor activity, though effectiveness across all stages varies.	Direct evidence links: 8 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
China — Potential energy	3.97 Plausible range: 3.22–4.60 Confidence (0–100): 66%	China’s consequential industrial and critical-material positions support a high assessment of mobilizable supply-chain resources. This is a broad structural estimate, not a claim of self-sufficiency in every advanced semiconductor input or technology. China’s industrial and critical-material position plus export licensing provide substantial regulatory and market leverage in selected areas. State-backed investment and domestic scale provide substantial resources, without implying unlimited or evenly converted capital.	Direct evidence links: 10 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
China — Time availability	3.42 Plausible range: 2.67–4.08 Confidence (0–100): 57%	China’s industrial position and ability to impose licensing controls provide some room to sequence and adjust supply-chain decisions. Public information cited here does not establish its reaction speed or the reversibility of its timing options across the whole semiconductor chain. China’s current industrial position and policy focus preserve some timing options, though constraints limit flexibility across the chain. Long project cycles limit China’s usable timing room, while existing industrial capacity and policy focus retain some adaptability.	Direct evidence links: 10 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
China — Context Adherence	3.45 Plausible range: 2.56–4.28 Confidence (0–100): 58%	China’s industrial and material-chain position fits its ability to act in selected semiconductor supply-chain areas. The assessment is limited because the sources do not provide a complete comparison of that position across all stages. China participates in an interdependent chain while pursuing selected self-reliance, though advanced constraints limit full autonomy. China’s export-control capacity is demonstrated, but interaction with broader trade and legal constraints makes overall fit uneven.	Direct evidence links: 13 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Defensive strength	3.67 Plausible range: 2.89–4.42 Confidence (0–100): 65%	Credible autonomy requires strong protection against supply disruption or external leverage in the semiconductor capabilities defined as essential. The exact scope is not specified, so the required level is high but not maximal. The objective requires dependable alternatives or access where disruption would threaten critical functions; scope determines the breadth. Credible autonomy requires strong targeted protection from concentrated suppliers at consequential bottlenecks, not every input.	Direct evidence links: 22 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Offensive strength	3.69 Plausible range: 2.87–4.47 Confidence (0–100): 64%	The objective requires enough capacity to develop and scale strategically important European semiconductor capabilities, but does not imply that every segment must displace all external producers. Selective processing capacity is required at consequential bottlenecks, not as full duplication of the global chain. Connected capabilities at selected stages are needed to reduce vulnerabilities rather than merely increase aggregate production.	Direct evidence links: 23 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Relational capacity	3.78 Plausible range: 2.99–4.54 Confidence (0–100): 65%	A credible 2035 outcome requires sustained coordination among EU institutions, member states, industry and trusted supply partners, particularly because semiconductor capabilities and inputs span multiple jurisdictions. The cross-border chain and EU member-state differences make durable partner coordination central to credible attainment. Credible attainment requires coordination across EU industrial, research, trade and security policy despite member-state variation.	Direct evidence links: 23 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Potential energy	3.91 Plausible range: 3.11–4.64 Confidence (0–100): 68%	The objective calls for substantial investment, research, production capacity and supply-chain depth. Independent reviews identify resource and scale challenges, supporting a high required level while leaving room for specialized external links. Specialized knowledge and skilled expertise are necessary for durable capabilities across selected semiconductor stages. Substantial sustained investment is required for selected semiconductor capabilities, but the appropriate level remains bounded by viable demand.	Direct evidence links: 24 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Time availability	3.74 Plausible range: 3.01–4.47 Confidence (0–100): 65%	Credible attainment by 2035 requires sufficient timing room to sequence long industrial investments and adapt to external supply changes without losing key options. This is a requirement for usable temporal flexibility, not a score of urgency. Credible attainment needs substantial usable timing room and adaptive responsiveness to address dependencies before disruption closes options. Long processing and qualification cycles require substantial timing flexibility to preserve options and adapt as technology changes.	Direct evidence links: 19 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Context Adherence	3.75 Plausible range: 2.95–4.51 Confidence (0–100): 65%	The objective requires close fit between EU capabilities and actual semiconductor needs, industrial economics, institutional coordination and supply-chain constraints. Broad self-sufficiency is not assumed to be necessary. The stated objective requires reduced critical vulnerability while preserving international interdependence, efficiency and competitiveness. The objective explicitly preserves productive efficiency and downstream competitiveness, making cost fit a central requirement.	Direct evidence links: 21 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
European Union — relationship toward China	4.50 Plausible range: 3.50–5.00 Confidence (0–100): 80%	The relationship is highly consequential and mixed: supply interdependence and selected Chinese leverage coexist with competition and EU exposure.	Direct evidence links: 4 · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
European Union — interest in European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035	5.00 Plausible range: 4.50–5.00 Confidence (0–100): 87%	EU semiconductor policy and continued attention to unresolved dependencies establish autonomy as a highly important current objective.	Direct evidence links: 4 · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
China — relationship toward European Union	4.50 Plausible range: 3.50–5.00 Confidence (0–100): 77%	The relationship is highly consequential for China, combining interdependence with competition and selected regulatory leverage; it is not uniformly hostile.	Direct evidence links: 5 · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.

China — interest in European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035	3.50 Plausible range: 2.51–4.50 Confidence (0–100): 59%	European autonomy matters to China through supply-chain positions and technology access, but evidence does not establish a unified intent to oppose it.	Direct evidence links: 4 · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — distribution assessment	4.00 Plausible range: 3.00–5.00 Confidence (0–100): 68%	The objective is partly shareable through diversified trade, but greater European control over selected capabilities can conflict with supplier leverage.	Direct evidence links: 9 · Notes · Web evidence · Question plan See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.

03 / EVIDENCE-TO-ASSESSMENT TRACEABILITY

Explicit recorded structural links are shown in compact form. Shared contextual evidence is listed once and referenced from the assessments it explicitly supports; assessment-specific evidence is then shown under each assessment. Missing lineage is reported as missing; no relationship is inferred from wording or similarity.

Evidence-origin note: Web evidence is public/source-backed evidence when recorded source references are present. Question plan entries are derived scenario-analysis dialogue evidence; they are not independent documentary sources and should not be read as such. Attachments and Notes are recorded scenario material supplied to the analysis.

The shared contextual basis establishes common case facts across several assessments; it does not by itself determine any assessment value. Differences between assessments depend on their assessment-specific evidence, rationale and recorded measurement layer.

Shared contextual evidence basis

Shared evidence S1 · Notes

The global semiconductor industry is organized through highly specialized and geographically concentrated stages; their interdependence makes complete regional self-sufficiency costly and difficult to achieve.

Sources: note-0001#1

Shared evidence S2 · Notes

Europe has strong positions in semiconductor manufacturing equipment, industrial chips, power electronics, and research.

Sources: note-0001#2

Shared evidence S3 · Notes

Europe has significant dependencies in advanced logic manufacturing, large-scale foundry capacity, and parts of the design ecosystem.

Sources: note-0001#3

Shared evidence S4 · Notes

Semiconductors used in defence, telecommunications, energy infrastructure, automotive systems, medical devices, and artificial intelligence have different performance, security, reliability, and supply-continuity requirements.

Sources: note-0001#5

Shared evidence S5 · Notes

Manufacturing capacity alone does not guarantee technological autonomy when essential design software, intellectual property, equipment, materials, packaging, and specialized expertise remain externally controlled.

Sources: note-0001#7

Shared evidence S6 · Notes

A disruption involving the Taiwan Strait could affect European industry through direct chip shortages and cascading interruptions across equipment, materials, assembly, logistics, and downstream production.

Sources: note-0001#18

Shared evidence S7 · Notes

A diversified combination of domestic capabilities and trusted international suppliers may improve resilience, but its effectiveness depends on partners' behavior during geopolitical crises.

Sources: note-0001#39

Shared evidence S8 · Web evidence

The EU has an established semiconductor policy framework and identifiable industrial strengths, but public EU and independent audit sources describe continued dependence on non-EU suppliers in advanced production and design.

Sources: [3] [2] [1]

Shared evidence S9 · Web evidence

The Commission's June 2026 Chips Act 2.0 proposal indicates that the EU currently treats strategic dependencies and supply-chain vulnerabilities as unresolved, while seeking to reinforce existing strengths and expand advanced-chip capacity.

Sources: [2]

Shared evidence S10 · Web evidence

The EU has formal economic-security and policy instruments relevant to semiconductors and critical inputs.

Sources: [2] [5]

Shared evidence S11 · Notes

Progress in a small number of bottleneck technologies could improve resilience without a large increase in Europe's aggregate production share.

Sources: note-0001#23

Shared evidence S12 · Notes

Europe's automotive and industrial customer base can support specialized semiconductor ecosystems.

Sources: note-0001#25

Shared evidence S13 · Notes

International partnerships can diversify supply and accelerate learning.

Sources: note-0001#32

Shared evidence S14 · Notes

Differences among EU member states in fiscal capacity, industrial priorities, and existing ecosystems may hinder coordinated investment and fragment incentives.

Sources: note-0001#29

Shared evidence S15 · Attachments

The evaluation identifies fragmented markets, low volumes in key sectors and limited procurement coordination as factors reducing the commercial viability of European production; without aggregated demand and reliable market signals, new capacity risks underuse.

Sources: [11]

Shared evidence S16 · Notes

Energy prices, electricity reliability, water availability, permitting processes, and environmental obligations can materially influence the location, cost, and timetable of European semiconductor investments.

Sources: note-0001#28

Shared evidence S17 · Attachments

The Chips Act announced at least €43 billion in policy-driven investment, expected to be matched by a similar amount of private investment, implying at least €86 billion in total.

Sources: [8]

Shared evidence S18 · Notes

Building semiconductor fabrication plants requires long investment cycles, reliable utilities, sophisticated suppliers, skilled workers, and sustained production volumes.

Sources: note-0001#19

Shared evidence S19 · Notes

Cyclical demand and customer concentration may weaken the economics of new semiconductor capacity in Europe.

Sources: note-0001#26

Shared evidence S20 · Notes

Export controls, tariffs, investment screening, and industrial subsidies may alter market access and reshape supply chains before major new European facilities become operational.

Sources: note-0001#34

Shared evidence S21 · Notes

The stated relevant outcome is not eliminating all imports, but durably reducing critical vulnerabilities without sacrificing innovation, productive efficiency, or the competitiveness of European downstream industries.

Sources: note-0001#42

Shared evidence S22 · Notes

China's efforts to develop a more self-reliant semiconductor ecosystem combine industrial policy, domestic market scale, investment, and technology acquisition.

Sources: note-0001#10

Shared evidence S23 · Notes

China continues to face constraints in selected advanced technologies.

Sources: note-0001#11

Shared evidence S24 · Attachments

China's semiconductor self-reliance efforts combine industrial policy, domestic market scale, investment and technology acquisition; the source also describes persistent constraints in selected advanced technologies without specifying them.

Sources: [12]

Shared evidence S25 · Web evidence

China is a strategically consequential counterpart through its semiconductor industrial capacity and role in critical-material supply chains.

Sources: [6] [1] [7]

Shared evidence S26 · Web evidence

China's export-control measures are affirmative evidence of state capacity to regulate selected supply-chain flows; they do not establish that every semiconductor input is controlled or that the measures are directed specifically at the EU.

Sources: [7] [6]

Shared evidence S27 · Web evidence

The available sources support a strong position in selected manufacturing and material-chain activities, but do not provide a complete, comparable assessment of China's present strengths and constraints across the entire semiconductor value chain.

Sources: [6] [1] [7]

Shared evidence S28 · Notes

The strategic significance of a dependency should be assessed through its likelihood of disruption, potential damage, availability of alternatives, and time needed to restore critical functions.

Sources: note-0001#40

Shared evidence S29 · Web evidence

The objective concerns a long-term reduction of strategic vulnerability in semiconductor supply chains, not complete isolation from international trade.

Sources: [1] [2]

Shared evidence S30 · Web evidence

The objective calls for a substantial, coordinated industrial and institutional base: public reviews point to needs spanning production, design, investment conditions, innovation and demand coordination.

Sources: [3] [2] [4]

Shared evidence S31 · Web evidence

The 2035 horizon leaves a defined period for structural change, but semiconductor capacity development and continuing external supply-chain exposure make adaptable sequencing and durable policy windows important to credible attainment.

Sources: [3] [2] [4]

European Union — Defensive strength

Assessment-specific evidence:

Notes: The strategic significance of dependence on imported semiconductors varies by chip category, application, substitutability, supplier concentration, and recovery time after disruption. · note-0001#4

Notes: Taiwan's centrality in advanced contract manufacturing creates a major concentration risk for global supply chains. · note-0001#15

Attachments: The paper identifies high concentration of critical inputs in particular regions, economies' specialisation in particular segments, and growing trade dependencies as structural features of the semiconductor value chain. · [9]

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 7.

Shared contextual basis: S1 · S2 · S3 · S4 · S5 · S6 · S7 · S8 · S9 · S10

European Union — Offensive strength

Assessment-specific evidence:

Attachments: The Commission cannot replicate member-state tax incentives at EU level because such incentives fall under member-state authority. · [8]

Attachments: The European Court of Auditors (ECA) concluded that the Chips Act provided new impetus and had made reasonable implementation progress, especially under Pillar I, but had weaknesses in preparation, implementation and monitoring. · [8]

Web evidence: European policy and industry provide a basis to expand production and retain important positions, but independent review finds that current implementation and investment are unlikely to deliver the original 2030 share ambition.

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 2.

Shared contextual basis: S2 · S3 · S5 · S11 · S12 · S13 · S7 · S8 · S9 · S10

European Union — Relational capacity

Assessment-specific evidence:

Notes: Coordinated European action can create scale. · note-0001#30

Notes: Within Europe, allocation of costs, benefits, technology ownership, and production sites may generate competition. · note-0001#31

Attachments: The Commission's evaluation says the existing Chips Act rapidly established an EU semiconductor policy and regulatory framework, mobilized substantial public and private investment, introduced EU-level infrastructure, and established governance mechanisms for coordination and crisis preparedness. · [11]

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 4.

Shared contextual basis: S2 · S12 · S14 · S13 · S15 · S8 · S9 · S10

European Union — Potential energy

Assessment-specific evidence:

Notes: Europe's position as a supplier of advanced manufacturing equipment may provide bargaining power. · note-0001#8

Attachments: The evaluation says EU-level pilot lines, competence centres and shared infrastructure have improved access to advanced tools and supported cross-border collaboration; it attributes a contribution to strengthening Europe's research and innovation base to the Act. · [11]

Attachments: The Chips Act's €86 billion investment ambition for 2022–2030 was small in comparison with the top global semiconductor manufacturers' planned €405 billion of investment for 2020–2023; TSMC, Samsung and Intel accounted for 60% of that amount. · [8]

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 5.

Shared contextual basis: S2 · S5 · S11 · S12 · S16 · S14 · S15 · S17 · S8 · S9 · S10

European Union — Time availability

Assessment-specific evidence:

Notes: Taiwan's centrality in advanced contract manufacturing creates a major concentration risk for global supply chains. · note-0001#15

Notes: Commercial outcomes for semiconductor fabrication plants are exposed to changes in technology and demand. · note-0001#20

Notes: The competitive landscape may change substantially before 2035 because semiconductor technology progresses faster than many industrial investment and permitting cycles. · note-0001#35

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 8.

Shared contextual basis: S1 · S2 · S6 · S18 · S19 · S16 · S13 · S20 · S8 · S9 · S10

European Union — Context Adherence

Assessment-specific evidence:

Notes: China's capacity growth in mature-node semiconductors could intensify price competition for European producers, even if the most advanced manufacturing segments remain constrained. · note-0001#12

Attachments: The source defines the relevant outcome as a durable reduction in critical vulnerabilities, not elimination of all imports, while preserving innovation, productive efficiency and the competitiveness of European downstream industries. · [12]

Attachments: Semiconductor manufacturing is highly energy-intensive, and newer processes may require up to ten times more power than previous technologies. · [8]

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 3.

Shared contextual basis: S1 · S2 · S3 · S4 · S12 · S19 · S16 · S14 · S13 · S7 · S21 · S15 · S8 · S9 · S10

China — Defensive strength

Assessment-specific evidence:

Attachments: The paper states that production of most semiconductor raw materials is largely concentrated in China, although many of the relevant elements occur in multiple parts of the world. · [9]

Attachments: China produced over 98% of global gallium in 2023 and was the leading germanium producer and exporter; the latest germanium production figure cited is for 2020, when China accounted for 68% of global production. · [9]

Attachments: The paper identifies high concentration of critical inputs in particular regions, economies' specialisation in particular segments, and growing trade dependencies as structural features of the semiconductor value chain. · [9]

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 2.

Shared contextual basis: S1 · S22 · S23 · S24 · S25 · S26 · S27

China — Offensive strength

Assessment-specific evidence:

Notes: China's capacity growth in mature-node semiconductors could intensify price competition for European producers, even if the most advanced manufacturing segments remain constrained. · note-0001#12

Attachments: Taiwan's central role in advanced contract manufacturing concentrates global supply-chain risk, while making cooperation with Taiwanese firms commercially and technologically valuable. · [12]

Web evidence: China has a consequential semiconductor and materials position and demonstrated state capacity to regulate selected supply-chain flows.

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 2.

Shared contextual basis: S22 · S23 · S24 · S25 · S26 · S27

China — Relational capacity

Assessment-specific evidence:

Attachments: The paper identifies high concentration of critical inputs in particular regions, economies' specialisation in particular segments, and growing trade dependencies as structural features of the semiconductor value chain. · [9]

Web evidence: China's importance to international supply chains gives it consequential relationships and channels of influence.

Question plan: EU-China semiconductor ties are consequential and mixed: interdependence and trade coexist with competition and economic-security tensions.

Shared contextual basis: S22 · S24 · S25 · S26 · S27

China — Potential energy

Assessment-specific evidence:

Attachments: China produced over 98% of global gallium in 2023 and was the leading germanium producer and exporter; the latest germanium production figure cited is for 2020, when China accounted for 68% of global production. · [9]

Web evidence: China's consequential industrial and critical-material positions support a high assessment of mobilizable supply-chain resources.

Question plan: China's industrial scale, state-backed priorities, domestic demand and position in selected material processing are current resources for semiconductor activity.

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 1.

Shared contextual basis: S22 · S23 · S24 · S25 · S26 · S27

China — Time availability

Assessment-specific evidence:

Attachments: Advanced fabrication facilities are described as among the most complex and expensive production facilities, and they take years to build. · [9]

Web evidence: China's industrial position and ability to impose licensing controls provide some room to sequence and adjust supply-chain decisions.

Question plan: China's current industrial and material-chain position preserves some timing options, but long project cycles and advanced-technology constraints limit flexibility.

Shared contextual basis: S22 · S23 · S18 · S24 · S25 · S26 · S27

China — Context Adherence

Assessment-specific evidence:

Notes: China's capacity growth in mature-node semiconductors could intensify price competition for European producers, even if the most advanced manufacturing segments remain constrained. · note-0001#12

Attachments: The global semiconductor industry is divided into highly specialized and geographically concentrated stages. · [12]

Attachments: Taiwan's central role in advanced contract manufacturing concentrates global supply-chain risk, while making cooperation with Taiwanese firms commercially and technologically valuable. · [12]

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 2.

Shared contextual basis: S1 · S4 · S22 · S23 · S24 · S25 · S26 · S27

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Defensive strength

Assessment-specific evidence:

Notes: The strategic significance of dependence on imported semiconductors varies by chip category, application, substitutability, supplier concentration, and recovery time after disruption. · note-0001#4

Attachments: The paper states that production of most semiconductor raw materials is largely concentrated in China, although many of the relevant elements occur in multiple parts of the world. · [9]

Attachments: The evaluation says EU insight into European and global semiconductor supply chains is too limited for strong crisis preparedness. · [11]

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 6.

Shared contextual basis: S1 · S3 · S4 · S5 · S6 · S11 · S13 · S7 · S28 · S21 · S29 · S30 · S31

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Offensive strength

Assessment-specific evidence:

Notes: The strategic significance of dependence on imported semiconductors varies by chip category, application, substitutability, supplier concentration, and recovery time after disruption. · note-0001#4

Notes: Public subsidies may attract manufacturing projects, but announced investment, completed construction, qualified production, and economically sustainable capacity are distinct milestones. · note-0001#21

Notes: An increase in Europe's share of global chip production would not necessarily reduce its most consequential dependencies if new capacity is concentrated in segments with limited strategic relevance. · note-0001#22

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 5.

Shared contextual basis: S1 · S3 · S4 · S5 · S18 · S11 · S13 · S20 · S7 · S28 · S21 · S17 · S29 · S30 · S31

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Relational capacity

Assessment-specific evidence:

Notes: Public subsidies may attract manufacturing projects, but announced investment, completed construction, qualified production, and economically sustainable capacity are distinct milestones. · note-0001#21

Notes: Coordinated European action can create scale. · note-0001#30

Notes: Within Europe, allocation of costs, benefits, technology ownership, and production sites may generate competition. · note-0001#31

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 4.

Shared contextual basis: S1 · S2 · S4 · S6 · S18 · S11 · S12 · S19 · S16 · S14 · S13 · S7 · S17 · S29 · S30 · S31

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Potential energy

Assessment-specific evidence:

Notes: Europe's position as a supplier of advanced manufacturing equipment may provide bargaining power. · note-0001#8

Notes: The availability of highly skilled engineers, technicians, and researchers may become as limiting as access to investment capital, especially where new facilities compete for the same talent pool. · note-0001#27

Notes: International partnerships may reproduce dependencies if critical knowledge, production decisions, or intellectual property remain outside European control. · note-0001#33

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 4.

Shared contextual basis: S1 · S2 · S5 · S6 · S18 · S11 · S12 · S19 · S16 · S13 · S7 · S28 · S21 · S17 · S29 · S30 · S31

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Time availability

Assessment-specific evidence:

Notes: Commercial outcomes for semiconductor fabrication plants are exposed to changes in technology and demand. · note-0001#20

Notes: The competitive landscape may change substantially before 2035 because semiconductor technology progresses faster than many industrial investment and permitting cycles. · note-0001#35

Notes: Policy choices made in the next few years may lock Europe into infrastructure, skills, and technology trajectories that remain difficult to reverse through 2035. · note-0001#41

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 4.

Shared contextual basis: S6 · S18 · S11 · S19 · S16 · S13 · S20 · S7 · S28 · S29 · S30 · S31

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Context Adherence

Assessment-specific evidence:

Notes: Commercial outcomes for semiconductor fabrication plants are exposed to changes in technology and demand. · note-0001#20

Notes: The economic case for competing in leading-edge logic differs substantially from the case for specialty chips, power semiconductors, sensors, photonics, mature-node components, and advanced packaging. · note-0001#24

Attachments: The source defines the relevant outcome as a durable reduction in critical vulnerabilities, not elimination of all imports, while preserving innovation, productive efficiency and the competitiveness of European downstream industries. · [12]

Additional explicit evidence links retained in the analytical artefact but omitted from this compact view: 3.

Shared contextual basis: S1 · S4 · S18 · S12 · S19 · S16 · S13 · S20 · S7 · S28 · S21 · S15 · S29 · S30 · S31

European Union — relationship toward China

Assessment-specific evidence:

Question plan: The EU-China relationship is strategically consequential and mixed, with interdependence alongside competition and selected supply-chain leverage.

Shared contextual basis: S8 · S9 · S10

European Union — interest in European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035

Assessment-specific evidence:

Question plan: Semiconductor autonomy is a highly salient EU interest, but its exact threshold and priority segments remain undefined.

Shared contextual basis: S8 · S9 · S10

China — relationship toward European Union

Assessment-specific evidence:

Question plan: China has state capacity to regulate selected supply-chain flows, which creates leverage but does not amount to control of the full semiconductor chain.

Question plan: EU-China semiconductor ties are consequential and mixed: interdependence and trade coexist with competition and economic-security tensions.

Shared contextual basis: S25 · S26 · S27

China — interest in European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035

Assessment-specific evidence:

Question plan: China's interest in EU autonomy is strategically relevant through supply-chain positions and technology access, but relevance does not establish opposition.

Shared contextual basis: S25 · S26 · S27

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — distribution assessment

Assessment-specific evidence:

Notes: International partnerships may reproduce dependencies if critical knowledge, production decisions, or intellectual property remain outside European control. · note-0001#33

Web evidence: The objective is partly compatible with continued international trade and diversified supply, but reducing dependence and securing control over selected strategic capabilities may conflict with existing supplier positions and leverage.

Question plan: The objective is partly compatible with trade and diversification but can create competition where greater European control changes supplier leverage.

Shared contextual basis: S13 · S7 · S21 · S29 · S30 · S31

04 / KEY ASSUMPTIONS

These are propositions whose continued validity matters to the current diagnosis because they are uncertain, explicitly evidence-dependent or decision-sensitive in executed robustness tests.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Context Adherence

The objective is durable reduction of critical semiconductor vulnerabilities while preserving innovation, efficiency, and downstream competitiveness—not complete self-sufficiency.

Why it matters: The required fit depends on which dependencies matter most; treating every import as a vulnerability would imply a much broader and costlier objective.

European Union — Relational capacity

European institutions and member states can build on existing coordination mechanisms, even though national priorities and funding differences may still hinder joint action.

Why it matters: The current reading relies on coordination as a usable capacity, not as a frictionless or already complete system.

China — Defensive strength

China has meaningful leverage over selected supply-chain flows, but that leverage does not amount to control of every semiconductor stage or input.

Why it matters: Keeping the assessment specific to evidenced materials and technologies avoids treating a partial supply-chain advantage as general dominance.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Potential energy

Credible autonomy requires substantial resources and durable capacity, but targeted European capability and dependable external links may meet the objective without duplicating the entire global chain.

Why it matters: This distinction separates the resources needed to address critical bottlenecks from the much larger resources implied by broad domestic replication.

05 / ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS

These are deliberately selected case-side readings already supported by recorded plausible ranges or uncertainty. They are not alternative strategies and are not invented to fill the report. This section is selective by design; Sections 07 and 08 provide exhaustive coverage of observed decision-critical full-family switches and their reassessment triggers.

European Union — Relational capacity

Reference reading: 3.26

Plausible alternative reading: European coordination may be less usable in practice than the existing frameworks suggest, if differences in national funding, industrial priorities, and project locations repeatedly block joint choices.

Decision implication: Give less weight to strategies that depend on current coordination working smoothly; reconsider the reading if fragmentation is shown to persist in consequential investment decisions. — toward a lower assessment: Different leading strategic family; toward a higher assessment: Leading mix changes — Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

European Union — Potential energy

Reference reading: 3.29

Plausible alternative reading: Europe's established strengths in equipment, industrial chips, power electronics, and research may support more strategically useful capacity than the present assessment assumes, especially if projects convert those strengths into qualified production and viable demand.

Decision implication: A stronger current-resource assessment could change how much the strategic reading depends on consolidating existing strengths versus developing additional capacity. — toward a lower assessment: Leading mix changes — Fortification and consolidation · Indirect breakthrough and targeted force · Opportunistic timing and context exploitation; toward a higher assessment: Leading mix changes — Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

China — Potential energy

Reference reading: 3.97

Plausible alternative reading: China's position in selected materials and its industrial scale may provide less usable leverage across semiconductor supply chains than a broad structural reading suggests, because strength in those areas does not establish equivalent reach in advanced technologies.

Decision implication: Keep the analysis focused on the specific inputs and stages affected; do not generalize this interpretation to the entire semiconductor chain. — toward a higher assessment: Leading mix changes — Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Context Adherence


Reference reading: 3.75

Plausible alternative reading: The objective could require closer alignment with the full range of semiconductor needs, supply-chain constraints, and partner relationships than a targeted-bottleneck interpretation implies, particularly if technology and demand shifts make current priorities incomplete.

Decision implication: Reopen the required-fit assessment if credible attainment is shown to depend on broader coordination across segments or on closer alignment with changing industrial needs. — toward a lower assessment: Different leading strategic family; toward a higher assessment: Different leading strategic family

06 / DECISION ROBUSTNESS

Calibration ranges and robustness frontiers



How to read it - Each row is one 6C condition. The blue interval is the calibrated plausible range; the dashed frontiers show the nearest observed decision-critical change toward 0 and toward 5. Frontiers inside the calibrated interval indicate greater sensitivity; frontiers outside it indicate greater robustness to the uncertainty already considered plausible.

Legend

	Calibrated range
	Robustness frontier
	Inside range
	At boundary
	Outside range
	No critical change to scale limit
	Curve crossing

This section checks how the strategic direction changes when one 6C assessment is varied at a time while the others stay fixed. It does not measure the probability of success. It shows which parts of the choice remain stable, which parts change emphasis, and which conditions can make a different strategic family take the lead. The six 6C conditions are Defensive Strength, Offensive Strength, Relational Capacity, Potential Energy, Time Availability and Context Adherence. A strategic family is a broader action logic grouping related strategic mechanisms.

18 6C variables considered | 111 tests, one variable at a time

Additional stress tests: 48 extra executions are excluded from the main test counts; some extend beyond the plausible range.

STARTING CONFIGURATION

Leading strategic motors 59 · 12 · 42 · 44 · 48

Opportunistic timing and context exploitation · Fortification and consolidation

RESULTS ACROSS 111 TESTS

26/111 Leading family stays the same

22/111 only the order changes · 4 /111 changes inside the same family

The same strategic family remains in the lead.

69/111 Leading mix changes

The mix of leading families changes, but at least one family from the starting configuration remains.

16/111 Different leading strategic family

A different strategic family becomes the leading set.

STRATEGIC FAMILIES IN THIS CASE

Opportunistic timing and context exploitation: Uses timing, experimentation and emerging openings to exploit or reshape changing conditions.

Fortification and consolidation: Protects resources and gains by strengthening coherence, institutions, barriers and durable foundations.

Relational context shaping: Uses relationships, alliances, legitimacy, narratives and indirect leverage to reshape the context in which choices are made.

Indirect breakthrough and targeted force: Seeks leverage against a stronger position through indirect moves, concentration on critical points and selective sacrifice.

Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal: Reduces dependence and strengthens position through selective withdrawal, indirect pressure and deliberate trade-offs.

OBSERVED COMPOSITION CHANGES

European Union

6C condition: Defensive strength

Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range

Families retained: Fortification and consolidation

Families exiting: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Leading strategic motors: 48 · 53

Value calibration range: 2.36–3.93

Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears near the edge of the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.

European Union

6C condition: Defensive strength

Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range

Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation

Leading strategic motors: 59 · 42 · 44

Value calibration range: 2.36–3.93

Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.

European Union 6C condition: Offensive strength Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 12 · 42 Value calibration range: 2.30–3.90 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears near the edge of the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Union 6C condition: Offensive strength Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 42 · 44 Value calibration range: 2.30–3.90 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Union 6C condition: Relational capacity Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families entering: Relational context shaping Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 58 · 42 Value calibration range: 2.43–4.04 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Union 6C condition: Relational capacity Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 44 · 42 Value calibration range: 2.43–4.04 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears near the edge of the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Union 6C condition: Potential energy Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families entering: Indirect breakthrough and targeted force Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation · Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 48 · 8 · 59 · 12 Value calibration range: 2.51–4.07 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.

European Union 6C condition: Potential energy Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 12 · 42 · 44 Value calibration range: 2.51–4.07 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Union 6C condition: Time availability Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 44 · 12 · 59 · 42 Value calibration range: 2.11–3.54 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Union 6C condition: Time availability Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 44 · 12 Value calibration range: 2.11–3.54 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Union 6C condition: Context Adherence Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families entering: Relational context shaping · Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 58 · 12 · 50 · 54 · 26 · 59 Value calibration range: 2.26–4.00 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Union 6C condition: Context Adherence Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 42 · 44 Value calibration range: 2.26–4.00 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.

China 6C condition: Defensive strength Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 42 Value calibration range: 2.89–4.45 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears near the edge of the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
China 6C condition: Defensive strength Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families entering: Fortification and consolidation Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 42 · 12 · 37 · 44 · 38 Value calibration range: 2.89–4.45 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears only outside the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
China 6C condition: Defensive strength Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 12 Value calibration range: 2.89–4.45 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
China 6C condition: Offensive strength Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 44 · 12 · 42 Value calibration range: 3.06–4.54 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears near the edge of the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
China 6C condition: Offensive strength Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 42 · 44 Value calibration range: 3.06–4.54 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears near the edge of the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.

China 6C condition: Offensive strength Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families entering: Fortification and consolidation Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 44 · 48 · 12 · 42 Value calibration range: 3.06–4.54 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears only outside the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
China 6C condition: Relational capacity Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 42 Value calibration range: 2.64–4.00 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears near the edge of the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
China 6C condition: Potential energy Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 12 · 42 · 44 Value calibration range: 3.22–4.60 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
China 6C condition: Time availability Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 44 · 42 · 12 Value calibration range: 2.67–4.08 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears near the edge of the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
China 6C condition: Time availability Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Fortification and consolidation Families exiting: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Leading strategic motors: 48 · 53 Value calibration range: 2.67–4.08 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears near the edge of the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.

China 6C condition: Context Adherence Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 12 · 42 Value calibration range: 2.56–4.28 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Defensive strength Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 12 · 44 · 42 Value calibration range: 2.89–4.42 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Defensive strength Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Fortification and consolidation Families exiting: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Leading strategic motors: 48 · 53 Value calibration range: 2.89–4.42 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears near the edge of the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Offensive strength Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 12 · 44 · 42 Value calibration range: 2.87–4.47 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Offensive strength Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families entering: Fortification and consolidation Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 44 · 12 · 42 · 48 Value calibration range: 2.87–4.47 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Offensive strength Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 12 · 44 Value calibration range: 2.87–4.47 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears near the edge of the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Offensive strength Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 42 · 44 · 12 Value calibration range: 2.87–4.47 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Relational capacity Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 12 · 44 · 42 Value calibration range: 2.99–4.54 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Relational capacity Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families entering: Fortification and consolidation Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 12 · 44 · 42 · 48 Value calibration range: 2.99–4.54 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Relational capacity Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 12 · 44 · 42 Value calibration range: 2.99–4.54 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears only outside the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Relational capacity Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families entering: Relational context shaping Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 58 · 59 Value calibration range: 2.99–4.54 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Potential energy Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 12 · 44 · 42 Value calibration range: 3.11–4.64 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Potential energy Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families entering: Indirect breakthrough and targeted force Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation · Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 48 · 8 · 59 Value calibration range: 3.11–4.64 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Time availability Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families entering: Relational context shaping Families retained: Fortification and consolidation Families exiting: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Leading strategic motors: 48 · 58 · 53 · 4 · 37 Value calibration range: 3.01–4.47 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Time availability Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 12 · 44 · 42 Value calibration range: 3.01–4.47 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Context Adherence Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 12 · 44 · 42 Value calibration range: 2.95–4.51 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Context Adherence Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families entering: Fortification and consolidation Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 42 · 44 · 12 · 48 Value calibration range: 2.95–4.51 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Context Adherence Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range	Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 59 · 44 · 42 Value calibration range: 2.95–4.51 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears near the edge of the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Context Adherence Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range	Families entering: Relational context shaping Families retained: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation Families exiting: Fortification and consolidation Leading strategic motors: 58 · 12 Value calibration range: 2.95–4.51 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.

TRANSITIONS INVOLVING A COMPLETE FAMILY CHANGE

European Union

6C condition: Relational capacity
Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range
Relational capacity
The tested variation enters a complete strategic-family change.

LEADING STRATEGIC FAMILY BEFORE THE TRANSITION
Relational context shaping · Opportunistic timing and context exploitation
LEADING STRATEGIC FAMILY AFTER THE TRANSITION
Relational context shaping
Leading strategic motors 58 · 29
Internal calibrated assessment: 3.26 · Observed change interval: 2.77-2.78
Value calibration range: 2.43-4.04
Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.

European Union

6C condition: Context Adherence
Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range
Context Adherence
The tested variation enters a complete strategic-family change.

LEADING STRATEGIC FAMILY BEFORE THE TRANSITION
Relational context shaping · Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal · Opportunistic timing and context exploitation
LEADING STRATEGIC FAMILY AFTER THE TRANSITION
Relational context shaping · Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal
Leading strategic motors 58 · 54 · 26 · 50
Internal calibrated assessment: 3.11 · Observed change interval: 2.51-2.52
Value calibration range: 2.26-4.00
Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035

6C condition: Relational capacity
Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range
Relational capacity
The tested variation enters a complete strategic-family change.

LEADING STRATEGIC FAMILY BEFORE THE TRANSITION
Relational context shaping · Opportunistic timing and context exploitation
LEADING STRATEGIC FAMILY AFTER THE TRANSITION
Relational context shaping
Leading strategic motors 58 · 29
Internal calibrated assessment: 3.78 · Observed change interval: 2.28-2.29
Value calibration range: 2.99-4.54
Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears only outside the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Relational capacity Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range Relational capacity The tested variation enters a complete strategic-family change.	LEADING STRATEGIC FAMILY BEFORE THE TRANSITION Relational context shaping · Opportunistic timing and context exploitation LEADING STRATEGIC FAMILY AFTER THE TRANSITION Relational context shaping Leading strategic motors 58 · 29 Internal calibrated assessment: 3.78 · Observed change interval: 4.28–4.29 Value calibration range: 2.99–4.54 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Context Adherence Tested change: Toward the lower end of the recorded plausible range Context Adherence The tested variation enters a complete strategic-family change.	LEADING STRATEGIC FAMILY BEFORE THE TRANSITION Relational context shaping · Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal · Opportunistic timing and context exploitation LEADING STRATEGIC FAMILY AFTER THE TRANSITION Relational context shaping · Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal Leading strategic motors 58 · 54 · 26 · 50 Internal calibrated assessment: 3.75 · Observed change interval: 2.08–2.09 Value calibration range: 2.95–4.51 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears only outside the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 6C condition: Context Adherence Tested change: Toward the upper end of the recorded plausible range Context Adherence The tested variation enters a complete strategic-family change.	LEADING STRATEGIC FAMILY BEFORE THE TRANSITION Relational context shaping · Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal · Opportunistic timing and context exploitation LEADING STRATEGIC FAMILY AFTER THE TRANSITION Relational context shaping · Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal Leading strategic motors 58 · 26 · 54 · 50 Internal calibrated assessment: 3.75 · Observed change interval: 4.35–4.36 Value calibration range: 2.95–4.51 Relation to the value calibration range: This change appears within the range currently considered plausible for this assessment.

How to read these results. Each test changes one 6C assessment at a time while the others stay fixed. If the leading strategic family remains the same, the choice is relatively stable under that variation. If the mix changes, the emphasis inside the choice is more sensitive. If a different family takes the lead, that condition deserves closer attention. Some extra stress tests may extend beyond the range currently considered plausible; those results are shown as outside-range cases, not as predictions or real-world thresholds.

Internal values and reported transition brackets are calibrated computational coordinates conditional on the reference assessment and declared simulation policy; they are not causal real-world thresholds or ratio measures. Each bracket localises one observed transition between adjacent tested points in a direction. A direction may contain multiple observed transitions, including reversions; observed brackets do not establish uniqueness or monotonicity across untested points. A full-family switch is classified against the reference configuration; adjacent test points may still share strategic families.

A no-switch result at the tested scale limit means that no complete strategic-family change was observed at the calibration boundary or at that tested limit. It does not prove that a non-monotonic switch and reversion cannot exist between untested outside-calibration points.

Technical detail. For each assessment, the robustness record preserves the outcomes observed at the declared tested points across the plausible interval, together with any available transition brackets and directional extensions beyond calibration when present.

Reading key: no change = the leading result is unchanged; order-only = the same leading set remains but its ordering changes; within-family move = leading motors change while the same strategic-family structure remains; composition change = the mix of leading families changes while at least one reference-configuration family remains; full family switch = a different strategic family becomes the leading set.

Assessment	Recorded value	Plausible range	Lower-bound reassessment	Upper-bound reassessment	Observed decision effect
European Union — Defensive strength	3.12	2.36-3.93	changes inside the same family → Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 2.75-3.12; 2.36-2.75	Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.12-3.14	Leading mix changes
European Union — Offensive strength	3.08	2.30-3.90	only the order changes → Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 2.70-3.08; 2.30-2.70	Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.08-3.10	Leading mix changes
European Union — Relational capacity	3.26	2.43-4.04	only the order changes → Leading mix changes → Different leading strategic family — Internal transition bracket 3.24-3.26; 2.83-3.24; 2.77-2.78	only the order changes → Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.26-3.64; 3.64-4.04	Different leading strategic family / Leading mix changes
European Union — Potential energy	3.29	2.51-4.07	Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 2.90-3.29	Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.29-3.68	Leading mix changes
European Union — Time availability	2.80	2.11-3.54	Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 2.47-2.80	Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 2.80-2.83	Leading mix changes

European Union — Context Adherence	3.11	2.26–4.00	Leading mix changes → Different leading strategic family — Internal transition bracket 2.70–3.11; 2.51–2.52	Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.11–3.13	Different leading strategic family / Leading mix changes
China — Defensive strength	3.69	2.89–4.45	only the order changes → Leading mix changes → changes inside the same family — Internal transition bracket 3.67–3.69; 2.89–3.28; 0.01–2.89	Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.69–4.06	Leading mix changes
China — Offensive strength	3.82	3.06–4.54	only the order changes → Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.80–3.82; 3.06–3.43	only the order changes → Leading mix changes → only the order changes — Internal transition bracket 3.82–4.17; 4.17–4.54; 4.54–5.00	Leading mix changes
China — Relational capacity	3.32	2.64–4.00	only the order changes → Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 2.98–3.32; 2.64–2.98	changes inside the same family → only the order changes — Internal transition bracket 3.32–3.66; 3.66–4.00	Leading mix changes / only the order changes
China — Potential energy	3.97	3.22–4.60	only the order changes → changes inside the same family — Internal transition bracket 3.91–3.97; 0.01–3.22	Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.97–4.26	only the order changes / Leading mix changes
China — Time availability	3.42	2.67–4.08	only the order changes → Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.37–3.42; 2.67–3.02	changes inside the same family → Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.42–3.73; 3.73–4.08	Leading mix changes
China — Context Adherence	3.45	2.56–4.28	only the order changes → Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.42–3.45; 2.99–3.42	only the order changes → changes inside the same family — Internal transition bracket 3.45–3.85; 4.28–5.00	Leading mix changes / only the order changes

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Defensive strength	3.67	2.89–4.42	Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.66–3.67	changes inside the same family → Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.67–4.04; 4.04–4.42	Leading mix changes
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Offensive strength	3.69	2.87–4.47	Leading mix changes → only the order changes → Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.67–3.69; 3.27–3.67; 2.87–3.27	Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.69–4.07	Leading mix changes
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Relational capacity	3.78	2.99–4.54	Leading mix changes → only the order changes → Leading mix changes → Different leading strategic family — Internal transition bracket 3.76–3.78; 3.38–3.76; 2.61–2.99; 2.28–2.29	Leading mix changes → Different leading strategic family — Internal transition bracket 3.78–4.15; 4.28–4.29	only the order changes / Different leading strategic family
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Potential energy	3.91	3.11–4.64	Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.87–3.91	Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.91–4.26	Leading mix changes
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Time availability	3.74	3.01–4.47	Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.37–3.74	Leading mix changes — Internal transition bracket 3.74–4.11	Leading mix changes
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Context Adherence	3.75	2.95–4.51	Leading mix changes → only the order changes → Leading mix changes → Different leading strategic family — Internal transition bracket 3.73–3.75; 3.34–3.73; 2.95–3.34; 2.08–2.09	Leading mix changes → Different leading strategic family — Internal transition bracket 3.75–4.12; 4.35–4.36	Leading mix changes / Different leading strategic family

07 / DECISION-CRITICAL SENSITIVITIES

Only assessments that produced a decision-material change are expanded here. The rationale and evidence references are case-side information; proprietary strategic-motor representations are not exposed. Where available, the interpretive reading explains why the observed direction is strategically plausible from the represented case without claiming algorithmic causality.

All decision-critical directions remain listed here. Composition-only movement is summarized compactly; full family switches receive the detailed cards below.

Assessment	Reassessment direction	Strongest observed effect	Internal transition bracket
European Union — Defensive strength	toward a lower assessment	Leading mix changes	2.36-2.75
European Union — Defensive strength	toward a higher assessment	Leading mix changes	3.12-3.14
European Union — Offensive strength	toward a lower assessment	Leading mix changes	2.30-2.70
European Union — Offensive strength	toward a higher assessment	Leading mix changes	3.08-3.10
European Union — Relational capacity	toward a lower assessment	Different leading strategic family	2.83-3.24; 2.77-2.78
European Union — Relational capacity	toward a higher assessment	Leading mix changes	3.64-4.04
European Union — Potential energy	toward a lower assessment	Leading mix changes	2.90-3.29
European Union — Potential energy	toward a higher assessment	Leading mix changes	3.29-3.68
European Union — Time availability	toward a lower assessment	Leading mix changes	2.47-2.80
European Union — Time availability	toward a higher assessment	Leading mix changes	2.80-2.83
European Union — Context Adherence	toward a lower assessment	Different leading strategic family	2.70-3.11; 2.51-2.52
European Union — Context Adherence	toward a higher assessment	Leading mix changes	3.11-3.13
China — Defensive strength	toward a lower assessment	Leading mix changes	2.89-3.28; 0.01-2.89
China — Defensive strength	toward a higher assessment	Leading mix changes	3.69-4.06
China — Offensive strength	toward a lower assessment	Leading mix changes	3.06-3.43
China — Offensive strength	toward a higher assessment	Leading mix changes	4.17-4.54; 4.54-5.00
China — Relational capacity	toward a lower assessment	Leading mix changes	2.64-2.98
China — Potential energy	toward a higher assessment	Leading mix changes	3.97-4.26
China — Time availability	toward a lower assessment	Leading mix changes	2.67-3.02
China — Time availability	toward a higher assessment	Leading mix changes	3.73-4.08
China — Context Adherence	toward a lower assessment	Leading mix changes	2.99-3.42
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Defensive strength	toward a lower assessment	Leading mix changes	3.66-3.67
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Defensive strength	toward a higher assessment	Leading mix changes	4.04-4.42
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Offensive strength	toward a lower assessment	Leading mix changes	3.67-3.69; 3.27-3.67; 2.87-3.27
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Offensive strength	toward a higher assessment	Leading mix changes	3.69-4.07

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Relational capacity	toward a lower assessment	Different leading strategic family	3.76–3.78; 3.38–3.76; 2.61–2.99; 2.28–2.29
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Relational capacity	toward a higher assessment	Different leading strategic family	3.78–4.15; 4.28–4.29
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Potential energy	toward a lower assessment	Leading mix changes	3.87–3.91
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Potential energy	toward a higher assessment	Leading mix changes	3.91–4.26
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Time availability	toward a lower assessment	Leading mix changes	3.37–3.74
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Time availability	toward a higher assessment	Leading mix changes	3.74–4.11
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Context Adherence	toward a lower assessment	Different leading strategic family	3.73–3.75; 3.34–3.73; 2.95–3.34; 2.08–2.09
European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Context Adherence	toward a higher assessment	Different leading strategic family	3.75–4.12; 4.35–4.36

Detailed full-family-switch directions

European Union — Relational capacity

Different leading strategic family · toward a lower assessment

Observed transition 1: Change from the immediately preceding tested point:
Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: Leading mix changes

Strategic families before this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation; Fortification and consolidation

Strategic families after this transition: Relational context shaping;
Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families entering the leading set: Relational context shaping

Families remaining in the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families leaving the leading set: Fortification and consolidation

Relevant public strategic motors: Strengthen relational commitments; Pilot, learn, scale

Internal transition bracket: 2.83–3.24

Observed transition 2: Change from the immediately preceding tested point:
Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: Different leading strategic family

Strategic families before this transition: Relational context shaping;
Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Strategic families after this transition: Relational context shaping

Families remaining in the leading set: Relational context shaping

Families leaving the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Relevant public strategic motors: Strengthen relational commitments; Amplify perceived resources

Internal transition bracket: 2.77–2.78

Interpretive reading: A sustained loss of practical coordination would weaken reliance on existing joint action. Approaches that reshape relationships and the conditions for cooperation would then become more plausible.

Direct evidence links: 15 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan

See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.

European Union — Context Adherence

Different leading strategic family · toward a lower assessment

Observed transition 1: Change from the immediately preceding tested point:
Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: Leading mix changes

Strategic families before this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation; Fortification and consolidation

Strategic families after this transition: Relational context shaping; Opportunistic timing and context exploitation; Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal

Families entering the leading set: Relational context shaping; Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal

Families remaining in the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families leaving the leading set: Fortification and consolidation

Relevant public strategic motors: Strengthen relational commitments; Accumulate small gains; Lead through ideas and values; Strength through selective refusal; Signal indirectly; Use time as leverage

Internal transition bracket: 2.70–3.11

Observed transition 2: Change from the immediately preceding tested point:
Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: Different leading strategic family

Strategic families before this transition: Relational context shaping; Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal; Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Strategic families after this transition: Relational context shaping; Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal

Families remaining in the leading set: Relational context shaping; Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal

Families leaving the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Relevant public strategic motors: Strengthen relational commitments; Strength through selective refusal; Signal indirectly; Lead through ideas and values

Internal transition bracket: 2.51–2.52

Interpretive reading: A weaker fit would make it harder to rely on current priorities as a guide to autonomy. The strategic response would need to change how European choices connect to supply-chain needs and dependencies.

Direct evidence links: 21 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan

See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Relational capacity

Different leading strategic family · toward a lower assessment

Observed transition 1: Change from the immediately preceding tested point: Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: Leading mix changes

Strategic families before this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation; Fortification and consolidation

Strategic families after this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families remaining in the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families leaving the leading set: Fortification and consolidation

Relevant public strategic motors: Use time as leverage; Accumulate small gains; Renew before disruption; Pilot, learn, scale

Internal transition bracket: 3.76–3.78

Observed transition 2: Change from the immediately preceding tested point:
Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: only the order changes

Strategic families before this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Strategic families after this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation; Fortification and consolidation

Families entering the leading set: Fortification and consolidation

Families remaining in the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Relevant public strategic motors: Use time as leverage; Accumulate small gains; Renew before disruption; Pilot, learn, scale; Build preventive barriers

Internal transition bracket: 3.38–3.76

Observed transition 3: Change from the immediately preceding tested point:
Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: Leading mix changes

Strategic families before this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation; Fortification and consolidation

Strategic families after this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families remaining in the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families leaving the leading set: Fortification and consolidation

Relevant public strategic motors: Use time as leverage; Accumulate small gains; Renew before disruption; Pilot, learn, scale

Internal transition bracket: 2.61–2.99

Observed transition 4: Change from the immediately preceding tested point:
Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: Different leading strategic family

Strategic families before this transition: Relational context shaping;
Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Strategic families after this transition: Relational context shaping

Families remaining in the leading set: Relational context shaping

Families leaving the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Relevant public strategic motors: Strengthen relational commitments; Amplify perceived resources

Internal transition bracket: 2.28–2.29

Interpretive reading: A lower coordination requirement would change what credible attainment demands. More focused approaches that reshape selected relationships, rather than broad coordination across the system, would become plausible.

Direct evidence links: 23 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan

See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Relational capacity

Different leading strategic family · toward a higher assessment

Observed transition 1: Change from the immediately preceding tested point:
Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: Leading mix changes

Strategic families before this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation; Fortification and consolidation

Strategic families after this transition: Relational context shaping;
Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families entering the leading set: Relational context shaping

Families remaining in the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families leaving the leading set: Fortification and consolidation

Relevant public strategic motors: Strengthen relational commitments; Use time as leverage

Internal transition bracket: 3.78–4.15

Observed transition 2: Change from the immediately preceding tested point:
Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: Different leading strategic family

Strategic families before this transition: Relational context shaping;
Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Strategic families after this transition: Relational context shaping

Families remaining in the leading set: Relational context shaping

Families leaving the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Relevant public strategic motors: Strengthen relational commitments; Amplify perceived resources

Internal transition bracket: 4.28–4.29

Interpretive reading: A higher coordination requirement would make relationship-shaping approaches more important: credible attainment would depend more heavily on aligning actors whose choices affect the same supply chain.

Direct evidence links: 23 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan

See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Context Adherence

Different leading strategic family · toward a lower assessment

Observed transition 1: Change from the immediately preceding tested point: Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: Leading mix changes

Strategic families before this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation; Fortification and consolidation

Strategic families after this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families remaining in the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families leaving the leading set: Fortification and consolidation

Relevant public strategic motors: Use time as leverage; Accumulate small gains; Renew before disruption; Pilot, learn, scale

Internal transition bracket: 3.73–3.75

Observed transition 2: Change from the immediately preceding tested point: Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: only the order changes

Strategic families before this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Strategic families after this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation; Fortification and consolidation

Families entering the leading set: Fortification and consolidation

Families remaining in the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Relevant public strategic motors: Use time as leverage; Pilot, learn, scale; Renew before disruption; Accumulate small gains; Build preventive barriers

Internal transition bracket: 3.34–3.73

Observed transition 3: Change from the immediately preceding tested point:
Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: Leading mix changes

Strategic families before this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation; Fortification and consolidation

Strategic families after this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families remaining in the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families leaving the leading set: Fortification and consolidation

Relevant public strategic motors: Use time as leverage; Renew before disruption; Pilot, learn, scale

Internal transition bracket: 2.95–3.34

Observed transition 4: Change from the immediately preceding tested point:
Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: Different leading strategic family

Strategic families before this transition: Relational context shaping; Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal; Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Strategic families after this transition: Relational context shaping; Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal

Families remaining in the leading set: Relational context shaping; Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal

Families leaving the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Relevant public strategic motors: Strengthen relational commitments; Strengthen through selective refusal; Signal indirectly; Lead through ideas and values

Internal transition bracket: 2.08–2.09

Interpretive reading: A lower fit requirement would support a more selective objective rather than broad alignment across the chain. Strategies that rebalance particular dependencies and shape focused relationships would become more plausible.

Direct evidence links: 21 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan

See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Context Adherence

Different leading strategic family · toward a higher assessment

Observed transition 1: Change from the immediately preceding tested point:
Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: Leading mix changes

Strategic families before this transition: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation; Fortification and consolidation

Strategic families after this transition: Relational context shaping;
Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families entering the leading set: Relational context shaping

Families remaining in the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Families leaving the leading set: Fortification and consolidation

Relevant public strategic motors: Strengthen relational commitments;
Accumulate small gains

Internal transition bracket: 3.75–4.12

Observed transition 2: Change from the immediately preceding tested point:
Leading mix changes

Destination outcome relative to the initial reference: Different leading strategic family

Strategic families before this transition: Relational context shaping;
Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal; Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Strategic families after this transition: Relational context shaping;
Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal

Families remaining in the leading set: Relational context shaping; Dependency rebalancing and selective withdrawal

Families leaving the leading set: Opportunistic timing and context exploitation

Relevant public strategic motors: Strengthen relational commitments; Signal indirectly; Strength through selective refusal; Lead through ideas and values

Internal transition bracket: 4.35–4.36

Interpretive reading: A higher fit requirement would make broad alignment with changing supply-chain conditions more important. Relationship-shaping approaches become plausible because partners and institutions would need to coordinate around that tighter fit.

Direct evidence links: 21 · Notes · Attachments · Web evidence · Question plan

See the explicit evidence-to-assessment mapping in section 03.

Interpretive readings are evidence-grounded explanations of why a reassessment direction can make the observed destination strategically plausible. They are not causal explanations of the proprietary matching mechanism.

Numerical transition brackets are internal calibrated coordinates used to localise observed transitions between adjacent tested points in a direction; they are not physical measurements, probabilities, percentages or causal thresholds in the external world. More than one transition, including a reversion, may be observed in the same direction, and the observed brackets do not establish uniqueness or monotonicity across untested points.

08 / REASSESSMENT TRIGGERS

These triggers identify evidence developments that should cause an assessment or the strategic choice to be reassessed. They describe monitoring conditions, not predicted events.

European Union — Relational capacity

Watch: Observed European investment decisions showing whether member-state differences in fiscal capacity, industrial priorities, and production-site allocation continue to obstruct coordinated action, or whether common mechanisms resolve those disputes.

Reopen if: Reopen the assessment if repeated consequential decisions show that existing institutions cannot align national priorities and resources, rather than isolated disagreements that are resolved through current processes.

Reassess toward: toward a lower assessment

Why it matters: A sustained loss of practical coordination would weaken reliance on existing joint action. Approaches that reshape relationships and the conditions for cooperation would then become more plausible.

European Union — Context Adherence

Watch: Observed policy and investment choices showing whether European capability-building remains aligned with the stated aim of reducing critical vulnerabilities while preserving innovation, efficiency, and downstream competitiveness, or instead repeatedly pursues capacity with little strategic relevance.

Reopen if: Reopen the assessment if a pattern of consequential decisions establishes that the Union's current capabilities and choices fit the governing semiconductor needs materially less well than the recorded reading assumes.

Reassess toward: toward a lower assessment

Why it matters: A weaker fit would make it harder to rely on current priorities as a guide to autonomy. The strategic response would need to change how European choices connect to supply-chain needs and dependencies.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Relational capacity

Watch: Evidence from investment choices and supply arrangements showing whether targeted capability development and dependable partnerships can credibly reduce critical vulnerabilities with less broad coordination among EU institutions, member states, industry, and partners than first assessed.

Reopen if: Reopen the requirement if documented outcomes show that a narrower set of actors and agreements can support durable vulnerability reduction without the wider, sustained coordination currently considered necessary.

Reassess toward: toward a lower assessment

Why it matters: A lower coordination requirement would change what credible attainment demands. More focused approaches that reshape selected relationships, rather than broad coordination across the system, would become plausible.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Relational capacity

Watch: Observed investment and policy decisions showing that differences among member states, fragmented demand, competing production-site priorities, or dependence on international partners make broad, sustained coordination more necessary for reducing critical vulnerabilities.

Reopen if: Reopen the requirement if these constraints are shown to prevent credible progress unless EU institutions, member states, industry, and relevant partners coordinate more closely and consistently than the current assessment assumes.

Reassess toward: toward a higher assessment

Why it matters: A higher coordination requirement would make relationship-shaping approaches more important: credible attainment would depend more heavily on aligning actors whose choices affect the same supply chain.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Context Adherence

Watch: Evidence establishing that durable vulnerability reduction can be achieved through a narrower set of strategically important segments, specialized architectures, or localized resilience options while maintaining viable international specialization.

Reopen if: Reopen the requirement if documented outcomes show that credible attainment needs less alignment with the full semiconductor ecosystem than currently assumed, because a narrower and workable set of capabilities or supply links addresses the critical vulnerabilities.

Reassess toward: toward a lower assessment

Why it matters: A lower fit requirement would support a more selective objective rather than broad alignment across the chain. Strategies that rebalance particular dependencies and shape focused relationships would become more plausible.

European Semiconductor Strategic Autonomy by 2035 — Context Adherence

Watch: Observed changes in semiconductor needs, industrial economics, or supply-chain constraints showing that credible vulnerability reduction requires tighter alignment among European capabilities, user needs, institutional choices, and international partnerships.

Reopen if: Reopen the requirement if these changes establish that the objective cannot be credibly attained through the current targeted approach and instead depends on closer alignment across more of those needs and relationships.

Reassess toward: toward a higher assessment

Why it matters: A higher fit requirement would make broad alignment with changing supply-chain conditions more important. Relationship-shaping approaches become plausible because partners and institutions would need to coordinate around that tighter fit.

09 / SOURCE REGISTER

The register contains only sources already recorded in, or recoverable strictly from references already recorded in, the analytical basis.

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8. SR-2025-12_EN.pdf
9. 4154cdbf-en.pdf
10. The future of European competitiveness_ In-depth analysis and recommendations_0.pdf
11. Chips_Act_20_Proposal_Ac7F1jMNml1ZBG4PbS1Q05c1RfY_129104.pdf
12. EUSEMICON2035_NOTES.md
13. Impact_Assessment_Report___Executive_Summary_60dtq8YRWYvYBZpXnXwk2qiteU_129109.pdf

14. Chips_Act_20_Proposal_Annexes_QKdNzJBKG5POVY8QOTLV0tcdItA_129105.pdf

15. SIA-State-of-the-Industry-Report-2025.pdf

10 / METHOD AND INTELLECTUAL-PROPERTY BOUNDARY

The client can inspect how the case was represented, which recorded evidence supports the assessments, what assumptions were tested and what evidence would reopen the choice. The 60-motor repertoire combines 36 classical stratagem-derived mechanisms with 24 additional strategic motors developed by IGS; IGS does not claim ownership of the classical tradition. The proprietary 6C matching algorithm, canonical values of the strategic-motor repertoire, internal weights, transformations, implementation code and prompts are intentionally outside the deliverable. When the Full Dossier is included in the same report package, it provides the complete current 60-motor comparative-fit ordering using public labels; this Annex does not duplicate that ranking. This separation protects the method while preserving decision traceability.